The Security–Development Nexus in European Union Foreign Relations after Lisbon: Policy Coherence at Last? by Furness, Mark & Gänzle, Stefan
The Security–Development Nexus in European
Union Foreign Relations after Lisbon: Policy
Coherence at Last?
Mark Furness and Stefan G€anzle*
One of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty’s objectives was to enhance the coherence of
EU-level foreign relations by improving collective action. Policy-level
innovations included ‘comprehensive’ and ‘joined-up’ approaches linking EU
instruments and actors, especially the Commission and the new European
External Action Service. Have these reforms improved policy coherence? We
focus on a key EU policy domain illustrating Europe’s engagement with the
changing global context: the security–development nexus. Although we ﬁnd
that collective action has improved somewhat since 2010, decision-making is
affected by bureaucratic actors catering to speciﬁc constituencies.
Accordingly, the coherence of security and development policies remains
challenged. The EU institutions lack strategic direction, which is unavoidable
in a system that lacks clear hierarchy.
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1 Introduction
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty introduced profound changes to EU foreign relations,1 a
governance system that involves both a vast number of cross-cutting policies and
institutional actors from the EU as well as 28 member states. In light of its ‘multi-level
actorness’, it is no surprise that the scope and conduct of the EU’s foreign relations are
constrained by collective action challenges. In contrast to previous attempts to improve
collective action between the various components of the foreign relations machinery, the
Lisbon Treaty forged entirely new bodies with the objective of bridging the
intergovernmental and supranational realms of EU foreign policy-making. By
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1. Even the simple task of labelling what the EU does outside its borders is beset by coherence problems
in terms of language. We use the term ‘foreign relations’ to encompass ‘external relations’ (the
activities of the European Commission outside the borders of the EU), ‘foreign policy’ (the CFSP),
‘security policy’ (the CSDP) and specific ‘external’ policy areas such as development, trade,
neighbourhood and humanitarian affairs, which are managed by the responsible Commission
directorates-general, often in cooperation with the EEAS and the EU delegations.
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combining the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and External Relations Commissioner in the new post of High Representative/
Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), by establishing the European External
Action Service (EEAS), by reforming the European Commission directorates general
(DGs) responsible for development and neighbourhood policy, by enhancing the
European Parliament’s oversight role, and by reforming the EU delegations, the Lisbon
Treaty aimed at drawing the policy-making systems for foreign and security policy,
development, neighbourhood and humanitarian response much closer together.
Concomitantly, the Lisbon Treaty changes reignited the debate on how to turn
the EU into a more integrated and comprehensive actor in international affairs
(Duke, 2008; Holland and Doidge, 2012; Smith, 2013). Underlying the strategy of
institutional reform at the EU level was the assumption that improving collective
action among actors with differentiated but complementary mandates, and creating
new actors with multiple policy responsibilities, should also improve policy
coherence. The intended outcome was not just a better functioning bureaucratic
system at the EU level, but also improved ‘consistency between the different areas of
EU external action’ (HR/VP, 2013: 2).
But does improving the conditions for collective action lead to greater policy
coherence? This article discusses this question with reference to the effects that the
post-Lisbon treaty reforms have had on how the EU handles the security–
development nexus, where policy-making requires cooperation among actors with
differing mandates, constituencies and capabilities. Existing accounts in the growing
body of literature on policy coherence in EU external relations have sketched out
normative expectations for policy coherence (Egenhofer et al., 2006, Sianes, 2013).
Five years after the Lisbon Treaty, we can begin to assess whether the innovations
have triggered tangible results.
Considerations of policy coherence can never avoid normative perspectives
entirely. Policy coherence concerns the externalities that decisions in one policy area
have for the intended outcomes of policy decisions in other policy areas (Nilsson et al.,
2012). ‘Coherence’ can, therefore, never be an abstract value existing in isolation from
normative preferences for given outcomes. This implies that policy coherence is best
served when the actors responsible for policy-making in various domains engage in a
process of designing and implementing comprehensive policy frameworks with strategic
objectives in mind, and that both the objectives themselves and the processes by which
they are pursued support rather than undermine each other.
Policy coherence for development (PCD) is a long-running debate in the EU
external relations context, both at the policy level in the several reports that the
European Commission has published, and in scholarly literature discussing the impacts
of, in particular, agriculture and trade policies on the outcomes of EU aid programmes
(Carbone, 2008; Young and Peterson, 2013). From a collective action perspective, the
defining feature of PCD is the identification of trade-offs and synergies across
interacting policy domains that can contribute to achieving strategic development
objectives that cannot be realized solely with development aid (Picciotto, 2005).
We argue that improving collective action through institutional and bureaucratic
reform cannot improve policy coherence in the absence of clear strategic direction.
This is because strategic direction is necessary for enabling bureaucratic actors to
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prioritize, and thereby to organize themselves institutionally and allocate resources
accordingly. However, strategic direction is in itself a collective action challenge in
that it requires leadership and trade-offs among competing policy objectives. The
Barroso II Commission, which oversaw the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation between
2010 and 2014, was not able to provide strategic direction for reasons discussed
below, but nevertheless prioritized collective action and laid important foundations
for improving coherence. The Juncker Commission, which took office in late 2014,
has taken further steps towards improved collective action and policy coherence, in
particular through the EU strategic review process (EEAS, 2015). To this end, the
June 2015 European Council encouraged a ‘process of strategic reflection with a view
to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close
cooperation with Member States’ (European Council, 2015: 6).
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the next section discusses the
relationship between collective action and coherence at the level of actors and
polices from a theoretical perspective. The third section details the main reforms
aimed at improving collective action in EU foreign relations introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty. The fourth section turns to the impact of these reforms on collective
action and coherence with regard to EU policy at the security–development nexus.
The final section concludes with some analytical and policy implications for EU
foreign relations and policy coherence for development.
2 Collective action and policy coherence
Policy coherence in EU foreign relations has been widely debated by scholars
asking what kind of international actor the EU is (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006;
G€anzle et al., 2012: 1–14). Some scholars have argued that the idea of ‘normative
power Europe’ is in fact a smokescreen for old-fashioned realpolitik (Hyde-Price,
2006). Others have noted that the EU’s responses to complex regional and global
processes are driven by a range of material and normative factors that require
alternative analytical explanations or narratives (Youngs, 2014). Ultimately,
questions about whether the EU’s foreign relations are primarily anchored in
norm-based policies such as human rights and democracy promotion or whether
its motives are primarily geo-strategic or economic concern not only the raison
d’e^tre, character and strategic outlook of the actor, but ultimately lead to
coherence debates, since they affect the preferences for different types of outcome
(Kreutz, 2015). In the EU, incoherence is magnified by the complexity of the
multi-level system and the plethora of constituencies and diverging interests which
are represented (Carbone, 2008). Consequently, policy incoherence is often the
outcome of unresolved or partially-resolved collective action problems (Gebhard,
2011).2
2. Although the term ‘coherence’ is widely used, its meaning has remained ambiguous. It tends to be
used interchangeably with other concepts such as ‘coordination’ or ‘consistency’. Coordination is an
important pillar of coherence. While ‘consistency’ refers to the character of an outcome, ‘coherence’
goes further and specifies the quality of a process, in which entities join in a synergetic procedural
whole that ‘structurally harmonizes’ actions and actors (Gebhard, 2011: 106).
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Conceptually, the link between collective action and policy coherence is related
to the public goods challenge of how the costs and benefits of policies are dispersed
and concentrated. On one hand, it is well known that when the benefits of a policy
change are large and concentrated among a group of actors, the group has a strong
incentive for acting collectively. On the other hand, when diffuse interests pull in
different directions, incentives to act collectively are lower (Blouin, 2007). The
relationship between collective action and coherence is mutually reinforcing: when
actors prefer different policy outcomes they are less likely to act collectively than
when they prefer similar outcomes, and vice versa. When the policy change in
question is one that is expected to lead to more coherence between two or more
policy areas, actors need to know that they will benefit from the change or they will
have lower incentives to support it (Ostrom, 2014).
Collective action problems become most apparent at the complex policy
interfaces or nexuses that link policy areas, where the effects of one policy affect the
outcomes of another. For example, arms sales may benefit the defence industry and
the local economy in a stable Western country, but are unlikely to benefit the
constituencies of that same country’s aid programme in a fragile developing country,
namely the development policy community in the Western country and the recipient
population in the fragile country (Hudson, 2006). While improved coherence
between defence industry policy and development policy may be possible through
technical adjustments to the design and implementation of those respective policies,
it is more likely that the core objectives of the two policies need to be identified and
a decision taken as to which is more important. This requires a clear understanding
of externalities and their impacts, and a hierarchy of goals in the context of the
power relations between the two constituencies. Given that formal and informal
rules governing policy-making and implementation are often shaped by interests that
try to ensure that the rules serve to perpetuate them, changes require leadership and
the legitimate regulatory authority to adjust the incentive structure for the actors
concerned, or to force compliance.
Coherence is not the natural state of affairs in bureaucratic political systems,
whether at national administration or EU level. Different policy areas tend to be
handled by bureaucratic actors that represent constituencies with different
preferences for policy choices and outcomes. When the interests of the constituencies
behind different policy areas clash, the bureaucratic actors mandated to design and
implement policy find it difficult to act collectively. Ideally, the complementarity of
policy orientations among different bureaucratic actors should be promoted top-
down by a political strategy that defines priorities and common goals, and assigns
responsibilities for addressing them. However, bureaucracies are not usually neutral
political actors that simply implement directives from above, but tend to seek
autonomy, leading to competition with other actors (Page, 2012). The potential for
bureaucracies to hinder the formulation of coherent policy responses has been
emphasized in studies of ‘whole of government’ approaches, especially in response to
security crises where effective engagement requires a combination of assets from
defence, foreign affairs and development bureaucracies (McConnell and Drennan,
2006). Coherent cross-governmental action in these contexts requires clear
overarching political guidance for engagement and incentives internal to
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bureaucracies for encouraging the promotion of goals and investing in coordination
processes (OECD-DAC, 2006).
The promotion of policy coherence is, therefore, as much a political as a
technical endeavour. Horizontal policy objectives do not always co-exist
harmoniously but are often contested. Indeed, ‘coherence’ itself only makes sense
with reference to the objectives with which policies should be coherent.
Conceptualizing policy coherence requires an understanding of goal hierarchies,
while working towards more coherent policy requires trade-offs between objectives
as incoherencies become apparent. Political constituencies with interests in particular
outcomes are unlikely to accept unfavourable trade-offs easily, even when there is
clear evidence of the negative effects of incoherence for others. The impact of
institutional reforms on policy coherence is, therefore, likely to be marginal unless
they are the result of a political decision to prioritize certain outcomes, reinforced by
an adequate system of incentives that can induce actors to behave in a certain way.
3 The Lisbon Treaty, collective action and coherence in EU
foreign relations
The EU and its predecessor, the European Community, have long linked collective
action and coherence through the so called ‘triple C’ of coherence, coordination and
complementarity (Picciotto, 2005). Coordination should lead to improved coherence,
whereas complementarity has the potential to undermine coherence. This is because
of the diversity inherent in the subsidiarity principle, whereby policy-making at the
EU level does not inhibit member states’ bilateral prerogatives and international
agreements (Craig, 2012). Systematic incoherences are built in at the EU level as
well. Underwritten by the institutional autonomy of development policy, the
compartmentalization of EU foreign relations among bureaucratic actors with
differentiated but at times overlapping responsibilities has become entrenched. The
EU has tried to overcome this by engaging in strategic discourses on objectives and
collective action, but has stopped short of establishing a clear set of strategic
priorities. EU strategic programmes have linked internal and external policies, such
as the Lisbon Strategy, its successor Europe 2020, and more recently the global 2030
Agenda (Bodenstein et al., 2016). In foreign relations, the European Security
Strategy (2003) and the European Consensus on Development (2006) aimed to
provide clear directions enforced by soft instruments, such as voluntary
harmonization among the institutions and member states concerned. None of these
policy statements was clear about what should happen when the EU’s many
objectives clashed, as they inevitably would.
Given that the EU has a long-standing formal commitment to PCD,
development policy could serve as the primary reference for coherence in EU foreign
relations (Egenhofer et al., 2007). Ever since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, external
trade has been part of the EU’s common commercial policy and therefore the
European Commission’s supranational competence. European Political Cooperation,
which was formalized in the early 1970s and became part of the Treaty of
Maastricht in 1992, Europeanized aspects of member states foreign and security
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policies, which nevertheless remained under intergovernmental modes of decision-
making in the European Council. With the emergence of a distinctive relationship to
former member state colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) in the
1970s, foreign relations were divided thematically and geographically between
different Commission DGs and between the Commission itself and the Council
Secretariat.
Development policy was added to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as a ‘shared
competence’ between the Commission and member states, and PCD became part of
the EU’s legal framework in article 178 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community and in article 3 TEU, which required consistency between all of the
EU’s policies and its external activities. Politically, the EU commitment to PCD has
developed further from the 1990s and was expressed in strategic policy declarations,
including the 2006 European Consensus on Development. These commitments also
bound member states to the PCD agenda. In 2005 the EU established a PCD unit in
DG Development, increased the use of inter-service consultations and started work
on a biennial PCD report (EC, 2009).3
The PCD agenda was further strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty,4 which
formally abolished the pillar structure that had hitherto put EU foreign relations
into different ‘silos’. The pillar system was regarded as a barrier to policy coherence,
particularly in the realm of security policy where responses to multidimensional
security threats demanded the availability of a range of instruments that could be
mobilized in response (Deighton, 2002). Symbolic of the end of the pillar system was
the merging of the offices of CFSP High Representative with the External Relations
commissioner into the HR/VP, and the establishment of the EEAS as an ‘interstitial
organization’ hovering between classical diplomatic service and supranational
Commission-bureaucracy (B"atora, 2013). In organizational as well as institutional
terms the multi-hatted nature of the HR/VP job description blurred the lines
between supranational and intergovernmental competences as well as decision-
making procedures. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the HR/VP conducts the CFSP,
presides over the Foreign Affairs Council and – as first Vice-President of the
Commission – coordinates external relations policies under Commission competence,
including development, neighbourhood and trade (Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012).
The design of the EEAS is a prime example of attempting to improve policy
coherence through collective action, in this instance by means of bureaucratic
innovation. Its staff members are drawn from three different parent institutions,
including Commission officials from the former external relations DGs, staff from
the Council Secretariat, and seconded member state officials. The establishment of
the EEAS meant reforms to the Commission’s external relations bureaucracy as
well, most notably the transfer of the ACP country desks to the EEAS and the
merger of the former DG Development’s policy units with the EuropeAid agency to
3. Rather than assessing the EU’s performance on PCD, the reports have been used principally as a tool
for communicating the agenda itself to member states and other partners, including the EU’s peers in
the OECD-DAC.
4. Article 208 TFEU states that ‘The Union shall take account of the objectives of development
cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’
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form DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO). The process brought new
expertise, including both diplomatic and development cooperation competences, to
the EU and enhanced connections between EU and member foreign and
development policy bureaucracies (Furness, 2013).
The Lisbon Treaty also enhanced the oversight of the European Parliament in
foreign relations, further complicating decision-making processes while making them
more inclusive. As Wisniewski (2013) has noted, the Parliament pushed hard for a
greater foreign relations role and achieved more influence than the Lisbon Treaty
intended. Although the Parliament has no role in the conclusion of CFSP decisions,
the increasing practice of trialogues – involving the Commission, Council and
member states – in legislative acts have made the Parliament an important
interlocutor (Murdoch, 2013). The Parliament also has increased authority over the
CFSP and CSDP budgets, and holds debates on the two policies every six months.
With regard to development policy, Article 209 TFEU requires that legislation
necessary for development cooperation be adopted by both the Parliament and the
Council, effectively placing both institutions on an equal footing. The Parliament
exercised its powers in 2013 when the regulations governing the EU’s external
financing instruments were negotiated in a strategic dialogue between the
Parliament’s Development Committee and DEVCO. The Parliament does not
control country-level implementation, but can question the Commission if it
considers that specific proposals promote causes other than development, such as
European commercial or security interests (Carbone and Keijzer, 2016).
These efforts to improve collective action through reforms to the EU foreign
relations machinery were undermined by the economic crisis that struck just as they
were implemented. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty coincided with the
global financial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis, creating a significantly tougher
political and fiscal environment than the boom years during which the Treaty was
drafted and negotiated. Much of Europe’s attention was directed towards internal
problems, in spite of momentous international events, particularly the 2011 Arab
Spring and its aftermath. EU officials who took part in the post-Lisbon Treaty
reforms lamented that the EEAS’ roll-out process was hampered by budget
constraints at the very moment when expectations on Europe to act were highest
(interview with EEAS official, Brussels June 2014). These factors also contributed to
the findings of a European Court of Auditors investigation, which noted that the
establishment of the EEAS was ‘rushed and inadequately prepared, beset by too
many constraints and vaguely defined tasks’ (European Court of Auditors, 2014: 4).
The report’s most important recommendations were to clarify the EEAS’ objectives
and strengthen its capacity for strategy and planning. Although the Court of
Auditors criticized the EEAS itself for not being proactive enough in prioritizing
strategic thinking, the lack of strategic guidance from member states in the
European Council meant that there was a narrow political space for prioritizing the
many tasks that the EU was expected to perform and the division of labour between
EU level and member state foreign relations activities.
The Juncker Commission declared its intention to provide more strategic
direction, partly by building on reforms made under Barroso and Ashton and partly
by setting clearer priorities for EU foreign policy. In his mission letter to the
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incoming HR/VP, President Juncker asked former Italian foreign minister Federica
Mogherini to ‘chair a Commissioners’ Group on External Action to develop a joint
approach’ (Juncker, 2014: 3f) and to move her headquarters from the EEAS
building to the Commission’s headquarters in the Berlaymont building. This action
seemed merely symbolic, and yet was clearly taken to improve collective action by
reinforcing Mogherini’s VP function and thus linking the EEAS and the
Commission more closely. The Juncker Commission’s intentions to improve policy
coherence were evident in its comprehensive review to the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) in 2015, which devoted significant attention to ‘priorities’ and ‘focus’.
The revised ENP framework resulting from the review was more clearly focused on
political stability and economic cooperation, with reduced emphasis on liberal-
democratic political and economic transformation (EC/HRVP, 2015b).
Since the 1970s, the core of EC/EU foreign relations architecture has remained
by and large intergovernmental: this applies in particular to defence and security
policies. Other foreign relations arenas, such as trade and development, have either
been anchored in Community or, alternatively, shared competence, bringing together
EU institutions and member states. Rather than calling for a clear separation and
hierarchical delineation of competences between EU institutions and the member
states in treaty terms, there has been an attempt to bridge the member states level
and the EU level by voluntary coordination and, more recently, by the creation of
sui generis institutions and bodies, such as the EEAS, as well as renewed efforts to
ensure coherence through collective action across the differently regulated policy
arenas of EU foreign relations.
4 Coherence through collective action: managing the security–
development nexus in EU foreign relations
The nexus between EU security and development policies has long been recognized
as beset by coherence problems (Hout, 2010). Some difficulties have been attributed
to collective action. Different areas of the security–development nexus (particularly
defence, civilian crisis response, humanitarian affairs and development) have been
managed by actors with very different mandates and goals. Defence has remained a
national concern despite efforts to increase EU-level cooperation as an alternative to
NATO (Biscop, 2012). In development policy, the Commission and member states
have parallel, sometimes overlapping and sometimes even competing policy
frameworks and country-level engagements. These are not always coherent with
other aspects of foreign policy, formulated both at EU and member state levels.
Humanitarian aid is managed at the EU level by a separate Commission DG, and
has remained an area in which tensions between international neutrality principles
and strategic policy processes for dealing with crises have long been noted (Macrae
and Leader, 2001).
A number of strategies launched in the first decade of the 2000s established
normative guidelines, although not strategic priorities, for improving coherence
between EU security and development policy. The European Security Strategy
(2003), the European Consensus on Development (2006) and the EU’s
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Communication on fragile states (2007) all called for EU level and member state
actors to work more closely together in a ‘whole of EU approach’ to addressing
global security and development challenges. In 2009 the EU decided to focus on five
priority challenges for PCD, including ‘strengthening the links and synergies between
security and development in the context of a global peace building agenda’ (EC,
2009: 4).
The Lisbon Treaty’s abolition of the pillar system was intended to ease EU-
level collaboration in legal terms since EU law did not apply to those parts of EU
foreign relations not under Community competence (Hoffmeister, 2008). However,
rather than tackling issues of legal competences, which would have required
clarification of the EU’s strategic priorities vis-#a-vis those of the member states, the
Lisbon Treaty’s compromise sought to improve policy coherence through improved
collective action among bureaucratic structures and policy reforms at the nexus of
security and development policies.
4.1 Collective action among actors
With regard to bureaucratic structures, the civilian–military dimension has become a
core area for increased cooperation among EU diplomats, military staff and
development cooperation officials in the context of certain missions and under the
broader umbrella of the CSDP. Operations such as the European Union Force
(EUFOR) intervention in the Central African Republic have demonstrated the need
for collective consolidation in the planning and execution of CSDP missions (Orbie
and Del Biondo, 2015). Outside the formal structures of inter-service consultations,
some flexible working methods have emerged, especially related to crisis response.
The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate within the EEAS has started to
coordinate EU-level responses to crises in specific country contexts, such as the
Central African Republic, South Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Syria and Libya. Although
there is no template, and processes are shaped by the issues raised by the crisis, the
EEAS has assumed a pivotal role, calling the meetings, drafting and circulating the
policy documents, often with ‘place holders’ for DGs European Community
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), International Cooperation and Development
(DEVCO), Neighbourhood and Enlargement (NEAR) or other Commission services
to include their competencies and perspectives. The European Parliament has
generally been excluded from crisis response strategies, which have been considered
CFSP and therefore European Council competence despite their increasing overlaps
with community policy areas.
Overcoming different institutional and organizational cultures and ways of
thinking about problems has, nevertheless, not been easy. Most EEAS officials
regard their organization as a ministry of foreign affairs and defence, not foreign
affairs and development. Although this may help broaden approaches by bringing
foreign policy and defence perspectives and development discussions together, it
does not imply more coherence. As one senior EEAS official noted, ‘the fact that
we’re not the Commission creates tension: development versus foreign policy
tension, but also institutional tension’. Institutional tensions have their roots in the
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reality that the Commission remains responsible for most of the EU’s financial
instruments, and the DGs with external budgets have looked to preserve their
decision-making autonomy. As the EEAS official put it, ‘the Council PSC (political
and security committee) wants to tell DEVCO what to do, but they’re not the
Commission. The PSC is comitology in the CFSP world, but not for [development
aid]. This is a clash, we’re solving it slowly, but it will create tension’ (interview,
Brussels June 2014).
Efforts to improve collective action in civil protection have had an ambiguous
impact on policy coherence, largely because of the strong desire of humanitarian aid
agencies to protect the independence of their mandate. In the context of the
reorganization of the Commission, DG ECHO assumed responsibilities related to
disaster preparedness inside and outside of the EU and therefore a coordination role
with respect to aid for disaster relief. The increased emphasis on disaster resilience –
which has a longer-term logic than humanitarian response – has implied closer work
between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO, for example on the Horn of Africa and the
Sahel where the coherence of development aid and humanitarian assistance has been
prioritized. The position of ECHO within these discussions has been to preserve the
independence of humanitarian aid. The EEAS and ECHO have placed similar emphasis
on crisis response, but ECHO officials have voiced a strong desire to keep humanitarian
aid from becoming overly politicized, whereas EEAS officials see it as de facto and
important political tool (interview with Commission official, Brussels June 2014).
The post-Lisbon Treaty reforms have certainly led to enhanced collective action
through increased cooperation among different services at the EU level.
Furthermore, the EEAS has assumed the role of an institutional bridge between
different bureaucratic cultures at the EU- and member state levels. At the same
time, the EU’s decision-making culture has not evolved as fast as the post-Lisbon
Treaty institutional frameworks, with implications for policy coherence. While the
bureaucracies and their officials have become more socialized in different kinds of
thinking, there have been many instances of misunderstanding between different
organizational cultures. Another EEAS official noted that ‘more and more you don’t
just have a CFSP process, but you also have the communitarian process.
Competencies are clear, but we haven’t established a one-size-fits-all process. There
is a gap between the Commission and the Council and we’re trying to bridge the
gap with the EEAS’ (interview, Brussels July 2015). In this sense, collective action at
the EU level remains constantly hampered by persistent ‘pillar thinking’ that has
prevailed despite the Lisbon Treaty’s abolition of the EU’s pillar structure. The
Commission’s approach has continued to be more technocratic, where officials talk
about instruments, the external dimension of internal policies, programming and
budgets. EEAS officials want a more political, quid pro quo approach (interviews
with EEAS and Commission officials, Brussels, June 2014 and July 2015).
4.2 Policy coherence: the ‘Comprehensive Approach’
With regard to nexus management, the EU has stepped up its efforts to improve the
coherence of its security and development policies. In spite of differing competencies
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and organizational cultures, widespread agreement on the necessity of a
‘Comprehensive Approach’ to the security–development nexus across the
Commission, the EEAS and the European Parliament has emerged since the Lisbon
Treaty. The European Council (2009) resolved to strengthen links and synergies
between security and development in the context of a global peace building agenda,
emphasizing strategic planning. The OECD-DAC praised the EU for these and
other efforts to bring security policy into the PCD agenda, and called upon the EU
to finish conceptual work on security, fragility and development ‘to ensure that
European objectives for development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and
international security are mutually reinforcing’ (OECD-DAC 2012: 15). In this
regard, the 2011 Agenda for Change called for the EU to ensure that its ‘objectives
in the fields of development policy, peace building, conflict prevention and
international security are mutually reinforcing’, and that ‘the EU’s development,
foreign and security policy initiatives should be linked so as to create a more
coherent approach to peace, state-building, poverty reduction and the underlying
causes of conflict’ (EC, 2011: 6–11).
Has the EU achieved this? The Barroso Commission’s most important policy-
level security–development nexus initiatives that followed the Agenda for Change
were regional strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel in 2011, and the
Comprehensive Approach to crisis response communication published in December
2013 (EC/HRVP, 2013). Similarly, the Pan-African Programme, funded under the
Development Cooperation Instrument with a budget of €845 million for 2014–2020,
has indicated the EU’s growing recognition of the need to address security–
development nexus issues in one policy framework (interview with EEAS official,
June 2014).
The Comprehensive Approach formulation process has, nevertheless, faced
significant collective action challenges. In 2010, the Barroso Commission commenced
work on a draft action plan on fragility started based on experiences in six pilot
countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen.
The plan was intended to clarify the role that the EU level of Brussels institutions
and EU delegations would have in relation to the EU’s member states, particularly
those with large presences in fragile countries. Discussion among member state
ministries, the Commission and the EEAS stalled in late 2010 after senior officials in
DEVCO and the EEAS were reportedly reluctant to commit to the text and the
political will to push it through dried up (interviews with EEAS and Commission
officials, Brussels January 2013) The action plan was not, however, a collective
action failure. The fact that the action plan draft was not publicly released did not
prevent the responsible units in the EEAS, DEVCO and the EU delegations from
incorporating its most relevant and sensible provisions into policy and operations
(G€ortz and Sherriff, 2012). For example, conflict analysis has been conducted more
regularly as a joint exercise involving member states, meaning that information has
been shared. This has contributed in particular to joint programming, where conflict
analyses have shaped division of labour at the country level (interview with
Commission official, Brussels June 2014).
Several issues that arose in during the action plan discussions remained in
focus, as attention turned to the ‘Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and
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crises’. There was resistance in parts of the Commission, because at the beginning
the Comprehensive Approach processes were conducted by the EEAS in parallel to
the fragility action plan and the relationship between the two processes was unclear
(interviews with EEAS and Commission officials, Brussels June 2014). The
Communication was drafted using a combination of Community and
intergovernmental methods, which officials involved in the process considered hard
to reconcile (interview with EEAS official, January 2013). The exercise of
formulating the policy document nevertheless brought people together from the
military, security and development policy-making areas at the EU level who had
hardly spoken in the past. Despite different backgrounds, these officials all had crisis
response experience, and with this the awareness that the tools under their purview,
whether military, civilian, technical or financial, were not on their own capable of
resolving a crisis (interviews with Commission and EEAS officials, Brussels, June
2014).
The Council Conclusions on the Comprehensive Approach stressed collective
action: ‘The EU’s policies and priorities should follow from common strategic
objectives and a clear common vision of what the EU collectively wants to achieve
in its external relations or in a particular conflict or crisis situation’ (European
Council, 2014: 2). The Communication was written to reflect joined-up thinking, but
existing structures were not efficient enough to promote this. As one Commission
official put it, ‘we now have a good policy document that instructs member states,
the EEAS and the Commission to work together, although it is still difficult to get
the military and development people to work together’ (interview, Brussels June
2014). The European Parliament was largely sidelined.5 Perhaps because the process
was driven by the EEAS, the outcome was heavily shaped by the dynamics of crisis
response rather than development, with the outcome that the development
perspective was – at least rhetorically – subsumed by security concerns (Faria, 2014).
The Comprehensive Approach has been tested under the Juncker Commission
in the form of two crisis response strategies: the Syria–Iraq strategy and the Political
Framework for a Crisis Approach (PFCA) for Libya, both formulated by the
EEAS. The first PFCA, circulated in September 2014, was not tasked by the Council
but emerged as an EEAS initiative. The process started with a meeting called by the
EEAS with all interested services, including DG Home Affairs (for counter-terrorism
and migration aspects), DEVCO, DG NEAR and the EEAS mediation unit. There
was also consultation with the sanctions and weapons proliferation colleagues in the
EEAS and the EU Delegation to Libya (interview with EEAS official, July 2015).
The European Parliament was not consulted as the PFCA is a restricted document.
In April 2015 the EU Foreign Affairs Council asked HR/VP Mogherini to update
the PFCA to focus on the way forward for Libya once a government of national
unity was formed. The document called for things like stronger EU support for the
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) mission and outlined the
appropriate EU policy tools for engagement (EEAS, 2015b).
5. The Parliament’s one success was in changing the name of the ‘Instrument for Stability’ to the
‘Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace’.
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The EU’s strategy for the Syria–Iraq crisis and the Islamist Da’esh threat was
formulated in response to events in the summer of 2014 and published in March
2015. As with the PFCA for Libya, the EEAS was in the lead for preparing the
strategy. The Commission’s DG NEAR had a major role as well, particularly in
bringing knowledge about processes and projects into the discussions. Informal
consultation with member states took place in December 2014 and EEAS officials
included their recommendations before the document template was circulated at the
EU level (interview with EEAS official, Brussels, June 2015). The Communication
posed three objectives: first, to ‘counter the threat posed by Da’esh and other
terrorist groups to regional and international stability’; second to ‘create the
conditions for an inclusive political transition in Syria’, and third to alleviate ‘the
human suffering caused by the ongoing violence and displacement’ (EC/HRVP,
2015a: 6). From a PCD perspective the strategy appeared heavily securitized with its
emphasis on ‘the Da’esh threat’. It nevertheless represented a comprehensive effort
to bring all of the EU’s tools to bear on a crisis situation, and was accompanied by
the launch of a new instrument, the 40 million euro Madad trust fund for
addressing the refugee crisis in Syria’s neighbours.
Two major observations can be drawn with regard to policy coherence. First,
the EEAS has increasingly become a hub for collective action and the coordination
of positions among EU institutions and member states. The negotiations leading to
the Comprehensive Approach communication provide a case in point, even if
questions remain as to how effectively the approach will be implemented. Second,
the post-Lisbon period witnessed the articulation of several, mostly regional,
strategies focusing on coherence through collective action at the nexus of security
and development policies, which provide important cornerstones, but do not add up
to a comprehensive strategy for mobilizing security policy for achieving development
objectives, as the PCD agenda implies.
5 Conclusions
Since the endorsement of the Lisbon Treaty there have been concerted efforts to
address the security–development nexus both in actor and policy terms at the EU
level. Development and CFSP capacities have been brought together in the EEAS
creating an ‘institutional’ locus that has helped reduce compartmentalization.
Policy coherence certainly gained a higher profile after the Lisbon Treaty, and
collective action has started to result in more coherence, based not just on
institutional reforms but on a (slowly) emerging set of norms regarding the most
appropriate and effective role for the EU. There has been convergence at the
level of discourse and rhetoric, towards a strategic culture of comprehensiveness
in foreign relations, which has been reflected in the increasing number of joint
actions and policy statements. The EU has been able to produce a
Comprehensive Approach communication focusing on crisis response, and several
regional strategies that outline the EU’s collective engagement in specific
situations. Its failure to finalize the much more ambitious fragility action plan
bringing together the entire peacekeeping, peacebuilding, state-building and
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development processes indicates that policy coherence at the security–development
nexus is still a work in progress.
Systemic incoherences, such as unclear or overlapping mandates, have only
been partly resolved. There are still differences between the EEAS and the
Commission with regard to engagement with crisis countries. DG DEVCO has
maintained its emphasis on development priorities and its implementation practices
have generally not changed. At the same time, the EEAS has tried to take a more
overtly political approach that has not always gelled with either the Commission or
with the European Parliament’s more traditionally developmentalist approach.
Policy-makers in the EU institutions have shown awareness of these problems and
their potential impact on policy coherence, and have taken informal steps to work
around some of the inconsistencies in the system.
The institutional underpinnings of nexus management mean that the role of
leadership is very important. As first HR/VP, Catherine Ashton not only had to
build her service from scratch, she also had to deal with huge expectations. Her time
in office was consequently perceived by many as failing to further collective action
and policy coherence. She was sidelined by the Presidents of the Commission and
the European Council on some issues, and her office was overwhelmed by the
multitude of tasks it was assigned. As a result, Ashton focused on her role as an
envoy and chief negotiator in key foreign relations processes, such as the Iranian
nuclear weapons talks, the Western Balkans peace process, and the Egyptian
revolution and its aftermath. Her VP role as coordinator of other commissioners
was mostly neglected. The Juncker Commission has taken steps to encourage the
EU foreign policy-making system to function more collectively. Perhaps the most
significant measure in this regard is HR/VP Mogherini’s overarching EU global
strategy, which aims to provide strategic direction for the various components of
EU foreign relations (EEAS, 2016).
Have the post-Lisbon Treaty collective action reforms and accompanying
strategic visions resulted in more coherence from a development policy perspective?
Institutional reforms are unlikely to improve policy coherence for development
unless they are driven by the political decision to prioritize development above
security or trade or other policy objectives, in instances where these are not
synergetic. The EU-level foreign relations decision-making system still lacks the clear
hierarchy that would enable it to set the priorities that are preconditions for policy
coherence. The Lisbon Treaty reformed the system’s structure of overlapping legal
competencies, but it left plenty of grey areas. The HR/VP and the EEAS are
mandated to work in these grey areas, but the Commissioners with international
responsibilities and their DGs have defended their turf, especially regarding
development aid. Meanwhile, security policy actors in the EEAS have continued to
focus on immediate threats rather than on long-term developmental challenges and
their weight in decision-making processes has been aided by the crisis atmosphere.
Accordingly, security–development decision-making processes have tended towards
managing incoherence to the best extent possible.
Nevertheless, key aspects of EU-level foreign relations policy have become
more coherent since the Lisbon Treaty, in the sense that the Comprehensive
Approach, regional frameworks such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies and
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the ENP review, and the crisis response strategies for Libya and Syria/Iraq are more
focused on priority objectives than previous policy frameworks. Unfortunately, from
a development perspective the focus has not been on PCD but rather policy
coherence for stability and security, where development aid plays a contributing
role. Ultimately, improving coherence in EU foreign relations over time will depend
on whether the EEAS develops into the hub for vertical and horizontal coordination
and accommodation of interests – respected by other EU institutions and member
states. Future research should investigate the EEAS’s actual capacities for assuming
this role – both at Brussels level as well as throughout the EU’s global network of
diplomatic missions.
ﬁrst submitted November 2015
ﬁnal revision accepted April 2016
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